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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel measure of civic norm compliance. We combine the literature
on norm compliance from institutional economics and social philosophy. Institutional
economics draws on survey data to measure civic norms, whereas social philosophy offers
a theoretical framework that proves fruitful when used to operationalize civic norms. This
paper shows that significantly different results emerge when the operationalization of
civic norms in institutional economics draws on the theoretical framework that social
philosophy offers. Furthermore, this study is relevant for social philosophy too, as it
shows the potential of survey data as a test-bed for philosophical theories of norm compliance.
Keywords: Social norms; civic norms; measurement; social survey data
1. Introduction
Institutional economists are increasingly interested in social constructs such as
civic norms. Civic norms are typically defined as rules of behaviour that regulate
social dilemma games and help a group to overcome free-rider problems (Guiso
et al. 2011). According to Knack and Keefer (1997: 1254), civic norms impose
‘constraints on narrow self-interest, leading individuals to contribute to the
provision of public goods of various kinds’. Examples of civic norms are for
instance norms against tax avoidance, claiming government benefits to which
one is not entitled, or littering. To measure civic norm compliance, institutional
economists largely draw on social survey data sets (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997;
Letki 2006; Owen and Videras 2006). They extrapolate items that capture
normative beliefs regarding the justification of certain pro-social behaviour, and
take such beliefs as an indication of norm compliance.
In social philosophy, the nature and function of norms, as well as the mechanisms
of norm-driven behaviour, are central topics on the field’s research agenda. In this
context, social norms are defined as implicit rules of behaviour that regulate
strategic interactions. They are represented via game-theoretic structures and
standard examples are fairness, reciprocity or promise-keeping. To measure norm
compliance, social philosophers design laboratory and field experiments where they
© The Authors, 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be
obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Economics & Philosophy (2021), 37, 188–221
doi:10.1017/S0266267120000152
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000152
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. GESIS - Leibniz-Institut fur Sozialwissenschaften, on 14 Sep 2021 at 13:44:11, subject to the
typically elicit two kinds of expectations, the so-called empirical and normative
expectations (Bicchieri 2006). Empirical expectations refer to the beliefs an
individual has regarding others’ behaviour in a certain situation – whether others
follow the norm in the appropriate circumstance. Normative expectations refer to
the beliefs an individual has regarding what others think that he/she ought to do in
that situation. Within this framework, both types of expectations are essential and
distinctive properties to infer the existence of a social norm in a group (Bicchieri 2006).
As this brief overview already shows, civic and social norms exhibit important
similarities: they both refer to social dilemmas and prescribe how to deal with them
in a group. However, it is also evident that the operationalization for measurement
purposes differs: institutional economists operationalize civic norms as normative
beliefs; social philosophers take normative and empirical expectations as key
properties for norm compliance. In light of the analogy in the definition of civic
and social norms, the differences in their operationalization are surprising and call
for an explanation.1
The aim of this paper is to combine insights from institutional economics and
social philosophy, in order to develop a novel approach to measure civic norm
compliance. A central element is the theoretical distinction between empirical
and normative expectations (Bicchieri 2006). We show that current measures of
civic norm compliance in institutional economics benefit from incorporating
empirical expectations as a key dimension of the construct.
Following the institutional economics literature, we use data from the European
Values Study to explore the role of empirical and normative expectations for civic
norm compliance. The European Values Study covers approximately 160,000
individuals from almost 40 countries in the period 1981–2008. The main results
show that by focusing only on beliefs about justification, institutional economics
has provided an equivocal measure of civic norms, whose outcome significantly
changes when incorporating empirical expectations. To this aim, we first
conduct a factor analysis at the individual level, where we find that both
normative beliefs and empirical expectations measure key dimensions of civic
norms. After that, we illustrate their economic consequences by examining their
effect on trust – a well-known case in the institutional economic literature. We
find, in contrast to results from institutional economics (Knack and Keefer 1997;
Tabellini 2008, 2010; Aghion et al. 2010), that the relationship between trust and
civic norms is largely driven by the existence of empirical expectations.
Our findings contribute to the existing literature in two main interrelated ways.
First, our results illustrate how the field of institutional economics can benefit
from a more solid theoretical foundation to measure civic norm compliance. In
particular, the results show that the incorporation of empirical expectations is a
1It might be pointed out that one of the distinguishing features of social norms is that they are implicit
rules of behaviour that regulate strategic interactions, whereas civic norms also refer to formal norms and as
such are part of a written body of laws. This difference, however, does not explain the difference in the
operationalization of the constructs in terms of normative beliefs (for civic norms) and empirical and
normative expectations (for social norms). Given that even formal norms, in order to be sustained,
require the members of a community to follow them and expect others to follow, there is no evident
reason to operationalize them only in terms of normative beliefs, i.e. what an individual thinks ought to
be done in a certain situation.
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viable measurement strategy to account for the inter-subjectivity of norms. This
aspect of civic norm compliance has largely been overlooked in the empirical
institutional economic literature (Leung and Morris 2015), but not in economics in
general. For example, the notion of multiplier effects (Glaeser et al. 2003; Cutler
and Glaeser 2010), as well as the notion of social network effects (Videras et al.
2012), illustrate the importance of the social context for behaviour (Manski 2000).
As of yet, however, the role of empirical expectations has largely been neglected in
institutional economics. By building upon a solid theoretical framework, this paper
effectively illustrates how to incorporate beliefs about others’ behaviour. Promising
extensions of this work lie in the application of the theoretical framework to other
norms that qualify as social norms, such as generosity or solidarity (Beine
et al. 2013; Burda et al. 2013; Helliwell et al. 2016), as well as to other economic
research that engages with the social context.
Second, studies on norms in social philosophy mainly consist of theoretical
analyses and experimental studies, whereas institutional economists often turn to
social survey data (such as the European Social Survey (ESS), the European
Values Study (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS)). The current study
illustrates that in social philosophy too survey data have the potential to yield
interesting and novel insights. Our approach complements experimental studies
in two main ways. First, in comparison to laboratory experiments, social survey
data allow us to access an impressive data set for a large number of countries,
this way supporting extensions to cross-cultural studies. Moreover, opportunities
to gain insights in, for example, norm change exist within reach when using
panel data. It can be easily shown, for example, how expectations have changed
over the years across generations. This result can be taken as a first indication of
norm change, which can then be further explored in combination with other
methods of empirical analysis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks more closely
at the accounts of norms in social philosophy and institutional economics. Section 3
introduces the data and methodology. Section 4 lays out the measurement results
and section 5 evaluates the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes by
discussing the implications of results and directions for future conceptual and
empirical work on civic norm measurement.
2. Norms in social philosophy and institutional economics
2.1. Norms in social philosophy
One of the most influential accounts of social norms in the philosophical literature
is that of Bicchieri (2006). Bicchieri’s analysis of social norms is developed in a
rational choice framework and, as such, it shares the same underlying approach
with institutional economics (see sections 2.2 and 2.3).
According to Bicchieri, social norms transform mixed-motive games into
coordination games, this way providing incentives for individuals to contribute
to the common good. To see how this works, consider a standard prisoner’s
dilemma game. When there are no social norms prescribing to contribute to a
common good, the incentives of the game are such that rational players prefer
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to defect from cooperation. However, when social norms are present, the payoffs of
the game change: the incentives to defect decrease by a factor that measures the
psychological (or material) cost of deviation. This cost arises when a player
expects that others cooperate and thinks that others expect her to cooperate. As
it was briefly mentioned before, these expectations are called empirical and
normative expectations.
More formally, a behavioural rule is a social norm when the following three
conditions hold for individuals that are part of a community or group:
(1) An individual knows that a rule exists and applies to a particular type of
situation (behavioural condition);
(2) An individual prefers to conform to the rule if:
(a) she expects that others will conform to the rule in situations of the
specified type (empirical expectations (EE));
(b) she believes that others expect her to conform to the rule in situations of
the specified type. This condition may or may not involve punishment
(normative expectations (NE)).
(adapted from Bicchieri 2006: 11)
Only when a sufficiently large part of the community – a subset – adheres to
these three conditions, it can be inferred that a social norm exists in that
community.
The first condition entails that an individual knows that the rule applies to a certain
context. This condition implies that for a behavioural rule (for example that you should
not litter in public spaces) one should know that the rule prescribes you to act in a
certain way when you find yourself in such a situation (e.g. to throw your rubbish
in a bin when you find yourself in a public space). Condition (2a) specifies that an
individual expects that others will conform to the norm in similar situations, e.g.
that others will throw their rubbish in a bin when they find themselves in a public
space. This expectation may arise through inference: when observing that others do
not litter, it is plausible to assume that their behaviour remains constant over time
and that they will therefore not litter in the future.2,3 The third and final condition
(2b) refers to the belief that an individual has about others expecting him/her to
conform to the norm, e.g. that others expect you to put your rubbish in a bin
when you are in a public space. For some people this belief is motivated by
observing that a form of punishment, such as shame or social ostracism, is
enforced. Normative expectations have a non-social counterpart that specifies
‘personal beliefs about what should be done’, so-called normative beliefs (Bicchieri
et al. 2014: 3).
2Not all norm conforming behaviour can be directly observed however. This holds, for example, for private
or implicit norms. Only the consequences of the former can be observed, yet this precludes causal inference.
Bicchieri gives the example of avoiding premarital sex. The absence of teen pregnancies could indicate norm
conformity, but does not necessarily do so (think of the use of contraceptives) (Bicchieri 2006).
3It should be noted that empirical expectations can be normative in the sense that they reflect a prudential
‘ought to’. This ‘ought’ does not necessarily state an obligation, but a belief that others ‘ought to’ throw their
rubbish in a bin when they find themselves in a public place (Bicchieri 2006).
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We highlight an additional feature of Bicchieri’s model. As Bicchieri shows,
normative and empirical expectations motivate norm conformity. When
individuals are asked why they followed a certain norm, they typically report
both kinds of expectations. However, there may be cases where normative
and empirical expectations are not both simultaneously present for the same
individual. For example, consider a group where recycling is not a common
practice. In this group, there may be an individual who does not have empirical
expectations (she thinks others typically do not recycle) but may hold normative
expectations (she thinks that others believe that she ought to recycle). Vice
versa, an individual may hold empirical expectations (she thinks others typically
do recycle) but lack normative expectations (she thinks that others believe that
she ought not to recycle). This theoretical distinction is examined in an
experimental study, in which Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) analyse the relative
importance of empirical and normative expectations for pro-social behaviour. In
particular, the study shows that empirical expectations tend to overrule
normative expectations when the former are present but the latter are not. In
other words, it is more likely that someone will follow the norm when only
empirical expectations are present than when only normative expectations are
present. An intuitive explanation for this is that, given that social norms
prescribe to contribute to a common good, if an individual believes that others
do not contribute to a common good but believes that others expect her to do
so, she might decide to defect as she realizes she would not benefit from the
advantages that derive from mutual cooperation.
2.2. Norms in economics
In the institutional economics literature, we encounter the notion of civic norms.
Civic norms have been defined in a variety of ways. As was briefly mentioned in
the introduction, Knack and Keefer (1997) define civic norms as constraints on
narrow self-interest that give people incentives to contribute to the public good.
Guiso et al. (2011: 3) define civic norms as ‘those persistent and shared beliefs
and values that help a group overcome the free-rider problem in the pursuit of
socially valuable activities’ (see also Nannicini et al. 2013). Related views are
found in the work of Owen and Videras (2006: 814), who state that civic norms
arise when ‘people cooperate and contribute to public goods more than is
expected given their incentives to free-ride’. Other studies refer to civic virtues
or civic morality, which are informed by ethical theories such as virtue ethics
(Letki 2006). These accounts stress the habit of forming civic virtues such as
trust, honesty and reciprocity. It is assumed that such virtues generate a sense of
responsibility for the public good that fosters cooperation and deters people
from corruption and free-riding. Other, more general, definitions describe civic
norm compliance as acts in favour of the community (Aghion et al. 2010) or as
an individual’s perception of how citizens should behave in relation to the state
(Kotzian 2014).
Oftentimes, civic norms are related to social capital (Letki 2006; Guiso et al. 2011;
Kotzian 2014): a phenomenon that generates trust and cooperation (Knack and
Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997), fosters economic growth and financial
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development (Knack and Keefer 1997; Guiso et al. 2004), and contributes to
well-functioning institutions (Letki 2006; Nannicini et al. 2013).4 The social capital
literature analyses the impact of civic norm conformity on various aspects of
society. In their seminal paper, Knack and Keefer (1997), for example, find a
significantly positive relationship between civic norm conformity, trust and
economic development. Other studies have related civic norm conformity
to citizens’ participation in society (Dalton 2008), to citizens’ perception of
their neighbourhood, and to citizens’ trust in others (Tabellini 2008; Aghion et al.
2010). Also the roots of civic norms have received attention (see for example the
work of Letki 2006; Dinesen et al. 2013; Kotzian 2014).
To operationalize civic norm conformity, scholars in institutional economics
typically use social survey databases (ESS, EVS and WVS among others).5 They
extrapolate survey items that inform us about one’s individual beliefs (Knack and
Keefer 1997; Owen and Videras 2006; Guiso et al. 2011). In particular, survey
items are selected that ask whether behaviour, such as avoiding taxes or claiming
government benefits to which one is not entitled, is justified. Such types of
behaviour are illustrative examples of instances in which civic norms play a role;
tax avoidance as well as claiming benefits to which one is not entitled are both acts
that can be considered as free-riding, since individuals choose to maximize their
own private gain instead of public gains. The selected survey-items ask respondents
to rate their beliefs regarding behavioural rules on a 10-point scale, where 1 is
‘never justifiable’ and 10 is ‘always justifiable’. Depending on the aim of the
analysis, scholars sum the individual items for each individual (Knack and Keefer
1997), recode the items using only the extreme responses (Owen and Videras
2006), or reduce the items to an underlying factor using factor analysis (Letki 2006;
Guiso et al. 2011). Moreover, analysis is conducted at the individual level (Dalton
2008), national level (Knack and Keefer 1997) or at multiple levels (Letki 2006;
Kotzian 2014).
Notice that the operationalization of civic norms considers whether an individual
believes that the civic norm in question is justified, but not what an individual believes
others will do. This is striking for various reasons. Accounts within the institutional
economics literature incorporate the interaction between the individual and the
group in their definitions, by taking civic norms as rules of behaviour that the
members of a group follow so as to contribute to the common good and to
overcome free-riding behaviour. As we saw before, also Bicchieri considers the
inter-subjectivity of norms to be a crucial aspect of norm compliance. Moreover,
within cross-cultural psychology and cross-cultural economics group-norms and
their influence on individuals’ behaviour is increasingly taken into account.
Perceived normative beliefs have been found to affect behaviour, and are in turn
affected by (one’s perception of) group behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975;
4In many instances, social capital is treated as a multi-dimensional construct that consists of trust,
associational activity (networks) and norms (Bjørnskov 2006).
5These surveys cover a wide range of topics, ranging from the respondent’s opinion on the country’s
economic system, to occupational preferences to his or her hobbies. For more information we refer to
the surveys’ websites (http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ and http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
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Cialdini et al. 1990).6 Fischer (2006) highlights the difference between self- and culture-
referenced value ratings at the individual level. He argues that social norms regulate the
latter. Relatedly, other scholars have argued that it is one’s perception of group
behaviour, instead of the actual group behaviour or personal beliefs (Shteynberg
et al. 2009), that directs norm conformity (Leung and Morris 2015). The
importance of social ties is also examined via social networks, in which individual
beliefs are modelled as being affected by one’s connections with others (Bandiera
and Rasul 2006; Videras et al. 2012). Norms are one of the several mechanisms
that are proposed as explanation of social linkages.
Furthermore, among others, Leung and Morris (2015) note that an ‘inter-
subjective approach’ that accounts for interaction between individuals is not put
forward in the institutional economics literature.7 Inglehart and Welzel (2005)
provide more detailed evidence that indicates that civic norm measures are not
as ‘civic’ as the literature suggests. Instead of measuring norm conformity, they
capture a resistance to conformity pressures (Delhey et al. 2011), which is,
according to Bicchieri (2006), an individual psychological parameter that might
modulate norm compliance but does not determine it.
2.3. Comparing the approaches
At this point, we may want to take stock and reflect on the sense in which social
norms and civic norms can indeed be compared in a meaningful way. After all,
Bicchieri’s operationalization requires behavioural, empirical and normative
expectations; survey measures, on the other hand, capture normative beliefs. The
respondent’s expectations regarding others and his or her beliefs regarding the
expectations of others are not taken into account.
One option would be to say that civic and social norms are simply different and
their measurement procedure reflects such differences. Remember, however, that
the concept of civic norms largely overlaps with the definition of social norms by
Bicchieri (2006). Both civic norms and social norms indicate rules that impose
constraints on self-interest so as to solve social dilemma games, i.e. situations
where the interest of a single individual is in conflict with the interest of the group.
Furthermore, both economists and philosophers refer to behavioural rules that can
be captured by one’s knowledge and beliefs.
Given the analogies, it would be surprising if different properties are operationalized
in order to test such similar outcomes. Moreover, institutional economists seem to
agree that the role of the group is crucial for civic norms, but they simply do not
include it in their measurement. In this respect, it is important to notice that the
operationalization of a definition is affected in important ways by the empirical
method that is used for testing a related hypothesis. It may be the case that
Bicchieri’s definition is too demanding when working with social survey data.
6This for example results in the distinction between descriptive norms – norms of ‘is’ that reflect what the
members of a group commonly do in particular situations – and injunctive norms – norms of ‘ought’ that
reflect what is considered as approved or disapproved behaviour (Cialdini et al. 1990; Kallgren et al. 2000).
7One could of course argue that individual beliefs are the product of shared beliefs, yet such an argument
is not put forward in the literature.
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Scholars in institutional economics are constrained by the availability of survey items,
which have not been originally collected with the purpose of testing civic norm
conformity. Other accounts that highlight the inter-subjectivity of norms may be
less demanding than Bicchieri’s definition, yet they do not offer a theoretical
framework in which expectations are conceptualized as essential conditions for
norm conformity. While perhaps more demanding, Bicchieri’s account formalizes
the role of the group in such a way that we can gain more insight into people’s
motivation for norm conforming behaviour (as motivated by NEs and EEs). To
examine this further, in the next section we suggest a possible way to operationalize
Bicchieri’s three conditions while using social survey data, which can be used for
standard examples of civic norms.
3. Data and methodology
Following institutional economists, we use the European Values Study. The EVS has
been conducted four times since 1980, resulting in four waves. These are contained
in a publicly available survey file that can be obtained from the GESIS Data Archive
for Social Sciences.8 This file covers European countries: 16 in the first wave, 29 in
the second, 33 in the third, and 46 in the fourth and final wave.9 With the exception
of some small countries such as Malta, at least 1,000 respondents per wave per
country have been interviewed.
For every country a representative sample of the population is constructed.
The survey draws from the population aged 18 and older and takes ‘regions,
districts, census units, election sections, electoral registers or voting stations, and
central population registers’ into account (Beugelsdijk and Klasing 2017: 142).
Moreover, the sampling procedure accounts for the degree of urbanization using
so-called Primary Sampling Units. All data are gathered through face-to-face
or phone interviews.
3.1. Operationalization of conditions
In order to assess ways to operationalize civic norm conformity while using social
survey data, we take Bicchieri’s three conditions as point of departure. To start with,
we are interested in measuring conformity to, for instance, the following
behavioural rule: to pay a fare when travelling by public transport. In an ideal
scenario, following Bicchieri’s framework, we would devise survey items that
reflect each condition. We would ask for the behavioural condition ‘When
travelling by bus or train, is there a rule requiring passengers to pay a fare?’.10
Upon a positive answer to the previous question, the empirical question would
ask: ‘When travelling by bus or train, to what extent do you expect that others
pay their fare?’. Finally, the normative question would ask: ‘To what extent do
you think that others expect you to pay your fare?’. Given Bicchieri’s framework,
8Survey file number ZA4804_v3-0-0.
9Canada and the USA are also included.
10See for example Bicchieri et al. (2014) for a similar approach, where vignettes are developed to
manipulate social expectations of respondents.
Economics and Philosophy 195
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000152
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. GESIS - Leibniz-Institut fur Sozialwissenschaften, on 14 Sep 2021 at 13:44:11, subject to the
conformity to the norm is more likely when all three conditions are present, in other
words, when the respondent answers positively to the three questions: ‘I know that,
when travelling by bus or train, there is a rule requiring passengers to pay a fare’ – ‘I
expect that (a sufficient number of) others pay their fare’ – ‘I expect that (a sufficient
number of) others expect me to pay my fare’.
Following this line of thought, we looked for survey items that match the ideal
scenario. To this purpose, we translated Bicchieri’s three conditions (behavioural,
empirical and normative) into keywords that reflect aspects of each respective
condition. In a next step, the keywords were used to extrapolate items from the
EVS, and as such to operationalize each condition. We briefly describe our
approach below.
For the behavioural condition, the EVS does not contain items that ask directly if
a respondent is aware of the existence of a rule in a certain situation. However, we
take the answer an individual gives about how he or she would behave in a situation
as the closest indication of the behavioural condition. To do so, we translate the
behavioural condition into keywords that ask for the respondents’ behaviour, for
example: whether and how often they engage in certain activities, whether they
are willing to engage in certain activities in the future, and whether they have
done so in the past.11
The empirical condition is represented by keywords that ask the respondents
questions regarding other people’s behaviour, using words such as: most people,
people in general, or compatriots. Who these ‘other people’ are is determined by the
country of residence of the respondent. Survey items are adapted accordingly. In
this manner the expectations towards other citizens are captured. For the
operationalization of the normative condition, we note that the EVS does not
contain items that ask whether the respondent expects that others believe that they
should act in a certain way.12 We thus follow the approach of existing measures
and use normative beliefs as first-best operationalization of normative expectations.13
We select keywords that are normatively laden, for example: moral rule, must, need
to, one should or duty. In doing so, we assume that if an individual believes that x
should be done or is justified, it is plausible to expect that this individual believes
that others think that x should be done. Table A1 gives an overview of all keywords.
3.2. Item selection
We use the keywords to search for items that operationalize the three conditions for
social norm conformity. The search yields a large number of items (> 600). From
11Note that we are dealing with stated and not revealed preferences. This is a general limitation when
working with survey data. Other limitations of survey data are for example that people answer
following social desirability biases or other response-style biases (we discuss this in the robustness
section). Vignettes or experimental studies might mitigate some of the limitations that characterize
survey analyses, as they allow to observe actual choice, but the results may suffer from other
limitations, such as experimenter’s effects (see for example Bicchieri et al. 2014).
12We are not aware of other data-sources that have incorporated such items. Moreover, other social
survey data sets, such as WVS or ESS, do not contain items that could be used to operationalize the
other two conditions for civic norm conformity.
13We use the term ‘normative expectations’ in the remainder of this paper to capture the first-best
operationalization of NE, namely normative beliefs.
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this list, we find that there are 18 items that capture normative (NE) and empirical
expectations (EE) with respect to the same behavioural rule.14 For these rules, there
are no items that can be used to test the behavioural condition together with the
normative and the empirical conditions. Omission of the behavioural condition
is, however, not as problematic as omitting the empirical or normative
condition. The latter two conditions together define a conditional preference,
which is, as argued in section 2.1, a prerequisite for social norm conformity.
The 18 extrapolated items ask for nine behavioural rules denoted as R: ‘Do you
think it is justified to do [R]?’ (NE) and ‘According to you, how many of your
compatriots do [R]?’ (EE). R captures civic behaviour that is related to the
common good and is situated in the public sphere, such as cheating on your
taxes or avoiding a fare when using public transport. The nine behavioural rules
and accompanying items are listed in Table A2. Answers to the NE items are
given on a 10-point Likert scale, where 1 reflects ‘never justified’ and 10 ‘always
justified’. EE items are measured on a 4-point Likert scale. An answer of
1 reflects the belief that ‘almost all compatriots do it’ and 4 that ‘almost none
do it’. We inverse the scale of the NE items such that their interpretation is in
line with the interpretation of the EE items: a higher score means a greater
likelihood that expectations are present.15 Consequently, a lower score should be
interpreted as a lower likelihood that expectations are present.
Recall that norm compliance requires the respondent’s normative and empirical
expectations to be both present (Bicchieri 2006). For the extrapolated items, this
entails the following. Taking the rule claiming government benefits to which someone
is not entitled as an example, an individual that answers the NE item with ‘never
justified’ and the EE item with ‘almost no compatriot does it’ believes that claiming
government benefits to which you are not entitled is never justified and that almost
no compatriot claims government benefits. For the individual in question, both
expectations are present and it is therefore likely that this individual conforms to
the civic norm and contributes to the common good by, in this case, not claiming
government benefits to which he or she is not entitled. Alternatively, when she
answers the NE item with ‘never justified’ and the EE item with ‘almost all
compatriots do it’, empirical expectations are absent while normative expectations
are present. Following Bicchieri, the likelihood that this individual conforms to the
civic norm is lower than in the previous case where both EEs and NEs are
present. Similar interpretations hold for the other eight paired items.
While the NE items are available across multiple waves, the EE items have only
been asked in wave 3 of the EVS (1999–2001).16 We therefore use data from this
wave in our analyses. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table A3. These
statistics show that the mean values of the nine matched NE and EE items
14For the remaining variables we are not able to find a shared behavioural rule, or, in other words, the three
conditions cannot be matched for a given behavioural rule. We therefore focus on the 18 selected items.
15We check in the robustness section 5.2 whether this decision affects our estimation results and we find
that it does not (see below).
16The following countries are included in our sample: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, Macedonia, Great Britain.
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differ. T-tests of the difference in (normalized) means for each matched pair show
that the differences are indeed statistically different as Bicchieri’s model would
predict: it suggests that the expectations are empirically distinct and thus the
likelihood to conform varies across individuals. In the next section we further
examine the relation between the two types of expectations.
4. Results
To examine the role of normative and empirical expectations for civic norm
compliance more closely, we proceed in three interrelated ways. First, we assess
the relationship between NEs and EEs. The second step is to determine whether
they are empirically different aspects of civic norm compliance, while potentially
part of the same construct. If NEs and EEs were to be empirically equivalent,
the incorporation of either in empirical applications would suffice as measure of
civic conformity. Third, we examine the relative importance of NEs and EEs
further by using the case of trust as illustration.
4.1. The relation between NEs and EEs
Bicchieri’s model requires that expectations are both present for norm compliance;
NEs and EEs should thus be positively related. To examine this further, we design a
regression model for each behavioural rule that explains each NE item by its EE
counterpart. A significantly positive coefficient signals that NE and EE are
positively related. For example, for the behavioural rule not claiming government
benefits we examine whether an individual who believes that his compatriots do
not claim government benefits, is also more likely to believe that claiming
government benefits is not justified. For each of the nine behavioural rules
denoted as R, we estimate the following regression model:
NERij  β0  β1EERij  β2Cij  εRij ;
where NERij captures normative expectations of individual i in country j for the
behavioural rule R. A higher value reflects a greater likelihood that normative
expectations are present. EERij reflects empirical expectations for individual i in
country j for the same behavioural rule R, where a higher value reflects a greater
likelihood that empirical expectations are present. We control for a set of socio-
demographic characteristics included in the vector Cij, such as age, gender,
highest attained level of education, income, employment status, marital status
and number of children (summary statistics in Table A3). Moreover, since it is
likely that individual expectations are affected by time invariant country specific
factors, we include country fixed effects, as well as standard errors clustered at
the country level to account for within-country correlation. We estimate the
model by means of a limited probability model.17
The results in Table 1 indicate that for each of the nine matched behavioural
rules, NEs and EEs are positively and significantly related. Thus for individuals
17For the ease of interpretability we show OLS results. We have however checked the robustness of our
results using non-linear models. Results of analyses in which we treat EE and/or NE as ordinal variables are
available in the online appendix and confirm our main results.
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Claiming state benefits 0.173***
(0.044)
Avoiding a fare 0.707***
(0.073)
Cheating on taxes 0.540***
(0.066)
Accepting a bribe 0.286***
(0.049)
Lying in own interest 0.770***
(0.049)
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Speeding in built-up areas 0.363***
(0.046)
Age 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.023*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender (female= 1) 0.118*** 0.205*** 0.311*** 0.199*** 0.280*** 0.153*** 0.283*** 0.341*** 0.407***
(0.021) (0.055) (0.032) (0.025) (0.037) (0.022) (0.027) (0.036) (0.034)
Highest educational level 0.039*** −0.009 0.026** 0.023* 0.023 0.018** −0.002 −0.015 −0.038***
(0.009) (0.027) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010)
Income level 0.030 −0.054 −0.047** −0.058** −0.118*** −0.022 −0.051*** −0.089*** −0.128***
(0.027) (0.040) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014) (0.031) (0.021)
Employment
(unemployed= 1)
−0.367*** −0.111 −0.229*** −0.174* −0.263** −0.095** −0.042 −0.046 0.019
(0.071) (0.087) (0.064) (0.082) (0.104) (0.041) (0.040) (0.049) (0.035)
Marital status
(married= 1)
0.189*** 0.328*** 0.200*** 0.147*** 0.263*** 0.141*** 0.131*** 0.192*** 0.178***
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Number of children 0.001 0.077*** −0.015 −0.003 0.035 0.010 −0.002 −0.008 0.020
(0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011) (0.007) (0.022) (0.013)
Constant 7.443*** 5.085*** 6.095*** 7.564*** 5.157*** 7.531*** 8.846*** 4.900*** 7.259***
(0.159) (0.340) (0.196) (0.176) (0.208) (0.121) (0.092) (0.193) (0.120)
Observations 29,940 14,811 30,481 16,965 16,234 31,575 31,611 28,884 31,454
R-squared 0.130 0.200 0.134 0.117 0.175 0.102 0.076 0.152 0.164
The nine columns show the regression results for nine separate regression models, in which the dependent variable is the NE for a particular behavioural R and the independent variable of interest
is the EE for the same behavioural rule R. The table depicts clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The regression models are estimated with country fixed effects.
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for whom NEs are present, EEs are more likely to be present too, keeping other
factors constant. This is in line with Bicchieri’s theory that posits a positive
relation between NEs and EEs in the case of norm compliance. The size of the
coefficients warrants more explanation however. From Bicchieri’s theory we can
infer that if all individuals were to conform to the norm at all times, we would
observe the EERij coefficients to be equal to 1. This is not the case: the
coefficients range between 0.10 and 0.77.18 Bicchieri’s theory offers various
explanations for this result. On the one hand, social norm conformity arises
when a sufficiently large part of the community adheres to a social norm. Given
that norm conformity requires the presence of both expectations, for individuals
in this group of followers we would expect a large coefficient. It might thus be
that a low coefficient pertains to a subset of non-followers. On the other hand,
social norm conformity may arise for some individuals with a low coefficient, if
for them norm conformity is driven solely by EEs. In these cases, NEs are
absent while EEs are present. Overall, on the basis of the available information it
is not possible to conclude what exactly a low coefficient implies regarding the
motivation of the respondents, but it does not necessarily exclude norm following.
In addition we find that, on average and keeping other factors constant, women’s
NEs are higher than those of men. The same holds for individuals that are married
or elderly. This may signal that these groups are more likely to comply with civic
norms, on the condition that empirical expectations are present too. We also find
that for individuals without a job, normative expectations are less likely to be
present, keeping other factors constant. This negative covariation might signal
cases where individuals are less inclined to conform to civic norms, especially if
empirical expectations are absent.
4.2. The two components of civic norms
The selected items reflect various aspects of civic norms and may therefore be
correlated. We conduct a factor analysis at the individual level that exploits the
correlational structure among the 18 items of interests. The results give further
insights into the relation between NEs and EEs across the nine behavioural rules
and their potential for empirical applications.
Factor analysis is a technique for data reduction. The technique looks for linear
combinations of the variables that explain as much of the variability as possible,
exploiting the correlation between observed variables (in our case: the 18
extrapolated items). In this way a set of new variables – latent variables – is
defined that underlie the observed patterns in the data. Our latent construct of
interest is civic norm conformity, potentially showing two dimensions that
reflect NEs and EEs as hypothesized. The estimation results are rotated using a
so-called oblique rotation, yielding factors that are unconstrained.19 Following
18The difference in the scale of both variables cannot explain the range. Rescaling the items such that they
are measured on the same scale yields results that are comparable to those in Table 1 (available in the online
appendix).
19A varimax rotation that does not allow for correlation between the two factors shows a similar pattern
as shown in Table 2. Results are available in the online appendix.
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the literature, we use a factor loading greater than 0.4 as the cut-off value (Stevens 1992).
Variables with a lower loading can be interpreted as uninformative, as they are only
marginally correlated to the underlying factor.
We select the appropriate number of factors using several selection criteria:
Cattell’s scree-test (also known as the ‘elbow criterion’) and the Kaiser-criterion.
The first criterion prescribes that we should retain the number of factors below
the kink of the scree plot (as depicted in Figure A1) (Cattell 1966). We observe
a kink at three factors, suggesting that we should retain two. The second
criterion uses the eigenvalues as benchmark. Factors with an eigenvalue greater
than 1 are retained. Based on this criterion, we should also retain two factors
(see Figure A1). Given the selection criteria, we conclude that a two-factor
model is the best representation of the underlying factor structure.
Table 2 shows that the two-factor model yields a clear pattern: we find two factors
that respectively reflect NEs and EEs. Items that ask whether certain behavioural
rules are justified load on one factor – factor 1 – whereas items that ask whether
compatriots display certain behaviour, load on factor 2. The two dimensions
are only weakly correlated, as the significant correlation coefficient of 0.08
Table 2. NEs and EEs as two dimensions of civic norms.
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
NE Claiming state benefits 0.55 −0.05 0.71
Avoiding a fare 0.59 0.06 0.63
Cheating on taxes 0.69 −0.01 0.53
Accepting a bribe 0.60 −0.02 0.65
Lying in own interest 0.63 0.02 0.60
Littering in public 0.49 −0.03 0.76
Driving under influence of alcohol 0.52 −0.01 0.73
Paying cash to avoid taxes 0.65 0.02 0.58
Speeding in built-up areas 0.55 0.03 0.69
EE Claiming state benefits −0.08 0.51 0.75
Avoiding a fare 0.03 0.49 0.75
Cheating on taxes 0.04 0.62 0.60
Accepting a bribe −0.02 0.52 0.74
Lying in own interest 0.11 0.53 0.68
Littering in public −0.03 0.53 0.73
Driving under influence of alcohol −0.06 0.50 0.76
Paying cash to avoid taxes 0.01 0.61 0.63
Speeding in built-up areas −0.02 0.56 0.69
Factor outcomes are rotated using an oblique rotation. N= 13,902.
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indicates (Pearson correlation coefficient). While significantly different from zero,
the correlation coefficient is sufficiently low to support the claim that NEs and EEs
are empirically distinct dimensions, while at the same time part of the same
construct. Additionally, the factor output indicates that NEs and EEs regarding a
particular behavioural rule, such as claiming government benefits to which one
is not entitled, are related to expectations regarding other kinds of behavioural
rules, such as paying a fare when using public transport. A norm-abiding citizen
seemingly contributes to the many different facets of the common good, or in
other words, when contributing to the common good, reciprocity arises as a
natural by-product.
In the subsequent step we approximate the two latent factors using the average
values of the nine items that load on each factor, labelling them NEs and EEs.
Averages are calculated even if the respondent has not answered all items. This
is a generally accepted approach, given that the latent factors underlie the
patterns that we observe (see for example Welzel 2013).20 We do so in order to
maintain as many observations as possible (N= 38,278). Some items have only a
limited number of observations; if we would only rely on these respondents our
sample would be greatly restricted (N= 13,902).21 Since the approximated latent
factors correlate perfectly with the latent factors, we are confident that they
measure the same construct.
4.3. An illustration: EEs explain trust
To examine the empirical difference between NEs and EEs in greater detail, we
revisit the relationship between civic norms and trust. Within the institutional
economics literature, this case has received much attention since the seminal
paper of Knack and Keefer (1997). They have shown that trust and civic norm
compliance enable economic growth. The study spiked scholars’ interest in the
topic (Beugelsdijk et al. 2004; Tabellini 2008, 2010; Aghion et al. 2010; Guiso
et al. 2011). Scholars found that civic norms foster cooperation, thereby instilling
a sense of respect and trust towards others (so called generalized trust).
As explained in sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this paper, the empirical evidence
supporting the claim that civic norm conformity and trust are positively
correlated relied on measures of normative expectations (amongst others, see the
work of Knack and Keefer 1997; Owen and Videras 2006; Guiso et al. 2011).
The empirical expectations regarding others’ civic behaviour have not been
considered in these applications. We therefore revisit the relationship between
civic norm conformity and trust to examine the relative importance of NEs and
EEs further. While these analyses yield interesting insights into the relationship
20This approach relies on two assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that all items contribute equal shares to the
latent factor. The rotated factor loadings in our factor model (Table 2) are between 0.5–0.6. Items thus have a
relatively equal share, supporting our approach. Secondly, this approach relies on the assumption that latent
factors can be approximated even if some of the items used in the factor model are missing. Given that all
observed items are correlated to the latent factor, we assume that answers to separate items can approximate
the latent factor. Missing answers should therefore not affect our measure.
21Robustness section 5.2 shows that this decision does not affect the main estimation results.
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between civic norm conformity and trust, we will not deal with them in a detailed
manner as they fall outside the scope of this paper.
To tease out the relative importance of NEs and EEs, we reproduce results of
existing studies in the first stage (eq. 1). Hereafter we run the same regression
for EEs (eq. 2). After we have established the effect of NEs and EEs separately,
we include both to see which one of the two survives in a ‘horse-race’ regression
(eq. 3). To the fourth and final regression we add an interaction term EEij  NEij
to see whether the effects of NEs and EEs are interrelated (eq. 4). More formally,
we estimate the following set of equations:
Yij  β0  β1NEij  β2Cij  εij (1)
Yij  β0  β1EEij  β2Cij  εij (2)
Yij  β0  β1NEij  β2EEij  β3Cij  εij (3)
Yij  β0  β1NEij  β2EEij  β3NEij  EEij  β4Cij  εij (4)
Yij is a binary variable that reflects generalized trust for individual i in country j.
We measure trust using the following EVS-item: ‘Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing
with people?’ (Knack and Keefer 1997; Tabellini 2008; Guiso et al. 2011).22
A value of 1 indicates that the respondent trusts most people. We control
for the same set of socio-demographic characteristics in the vector Cij as in
section 4.1. The variables of interest – NEij and EEij – are constructed as
described in the previous section. Moreover, we include country fixed effects, as
well as clustered standard errors at the country level, to control for any time
invariant country specific factors.
We estimate the four equations using a fixed effects logistic regression model to
account for the binary nature of our dependent variable. We estimate the four
equations on the same sample of respondents for matters of comparability.
Respondents are included if they have an average value for both NEij and EEij.
Table 3 tabulates the estimation results. We only report the coefficients of
interest (NEij, EEij and EEij  NEij).23 Coefficients are reported as log odds,
which are the natural logarithm of an odds ratio. Positive log odds indicate a
positive relationship, and vice versa. To give an account of the effect sizes, we
refer to odds ratios in the text. Odds ratios indicate the ratio of the odds of
success for one group, divided by the odds of success for another group. In our
case, we look at the odds of trusting most people versus the odds of feeling that
one needs to be careful when dealing with other people.
Table 3 shows that citizens that are likely to conform to civic norms tend to be
more trusting towards others. More specifically, the odds of saying that most people
can be trusted are 1.5 times higher for each point increase in the level of EEs, all else
equal. Interestingly, we find that only EEs drive this result; NEs have an insignificant
relation to trust even when we do not control for EEs (column 1). These findings are
striking given that the literature has relied predominantly on measures of NEs when
22Item A165 of the EVS data set.
23Full results are available in the online appendix.
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examining the relationship between civic norm conformity and trust. Our results
suggest that generalized trust is enforced when individuals expect that others
adhere to civic norms (columns 2–4). This implies that we tend to be more
trusting when we expect that others are engaged, cooperating citizens. Whether
we control for NEs or not, the significantly positive effect of EEs on trust remains.
The findings illustrate that empirical expectations also have explanatory power.
This is in line with findings of Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) who establish that
empirical expectations regarding the behaviour of others matter relatively more
for individual decision making than normative expectations. Moreover, the
results show that NEs should not be taken as conclusive in assessing civic norm
conformity; in line with Bicchieri’s theory the results suggest that NEs and EEs
are inherently different aspects of norm conformity.
One may be concerned that the results in Table 3 are affected by the choice of
generalized trust as dependent variable. The generalized trust item can be rephrased
as ‘According to you, how many of your compatriots do things that make you trust
them ( : : : )?’. Phrased this way, generalized trust appears an empirical expectation
(following the operationalization in section 3) and then it is unsurprising that EEs
are positively correlated with generalized trust. For this to be true, generalized trust
should depend on the behaviour of others. In institutional economics, a body of
literature has shown that general trust is an inherited value (Glaeser et al. 2000;
Guiso et al. 2006; Uslaner 2008; Algan and Cahuc 2010; Dohmen et al. 2012). Trust
persists via the parental transmission (Guiso et al. 2006) and is even shown to have
roots that go further back into time (Uslaner 2008). Moreover, a study of Delhey
et al. (2011) shows that the generalized trust item works well as a measure of
generalized trust in Western and affluent nations, but less so in other countries. For
the sample of countries included in our analyses this implies that generalized trust
can be considered as a deeply rooted value that extends beyond the family onto
people that differ from yourself (Uslaner and Conley 2003). Given these properties,
we have no reason to suspect that our measurement results are biased.
Table 3. The impact of NEs and EEs on trust.
Generalized trust (logit)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
NE −0.001 −0.017 0.042
(0.027) (0.026) (0.075)




Observations 31,285 31,285 31,285 31,285
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.107 0.107 0.107
Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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5. Robustness analyses
To corroborate our findings we run several additional analyses. The analyses
confirm that the main findings are robust to alternative specifications and
estimation techniques.
5.1. Response-style biases
We assess whether survey responses are affected by factors that are unrelated to the
survey item’s content (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2001; Beugelsdijk and Klasing
2017). Such response-styles may bias our results and therefore warrant attention.
Previous research has shown that extreme response styles (ERS) can be explained
by country-level extraversion (Harzing 2006), and are more likely to be encount-
ered in countries with high uncertainty avoidance and high power distance
(Hofstede 1980). ERS refers to responses that are at the extreme ends of an
answer-scale (negative or positive). In contrast, people may also have a tendency to
give responses that lie in the middle of the answer-scale, so-called middle response
styles (MRS). Such styles are argued to be more prevalent in collectivist societies
(Hofstede 1980). For further details regarding these hypotheses we refer to the
work of Harzing (2006) and Beugelsdijk and Klasing (2017).
We test for ERS and MRS biases in the following manner: negative ERS is the
fraction of people within a country that has given either the response 1 (EE) or
9/10 (NE). Positive ERS is defined as the fraction of people within a country
that has given the response 4 (EE) or 1/2 (NE). MRS on the other hand focuses
on the middle range responses: the fraction of people that has answered 2/3 (EE)
or 5/6 (NE). We run a set of regressions at the country level with negative ERS,
positive ERS and MRS as dependent variables and the degree of extraversion
(Lynn and Martin 1995; Hemert et al. 2002), individualism, power distance and
uncertainty avoidance as independent variables (Hofstede 1980, 2001). Significant
effects of the four independent variables indicate we should be concerned for the
consistency of the main findings. However, we find no significant relations between
the dependent and independent variables: all coefficients are not significantly
different from zero (see Table A4). This suggests that the results are not liable to
response style biases.
5.2. Operationalization of NEs and EEs
NEs and EEs are measured on two different scales, i.e. a 10-point and 4-point
scale. We check whether the results in Table 3 change if we rescale the NE
items such that both NE and EE items are measured on a 4-point scale: for all
NE items we construct a measure that attributes the values 1, 2 and 3 to a
value 4; the values 4 and 5 to a value 3; the values 6 and 7 to a value 2; and
the values 8, 9, and 10 to a value 1.24 We take the average value of the nine
survey items to reconstruct our NE measure and use this measure in our
regression model (eq. 1–4). For matters of brevity, Table 4 displays the
24The results in Tables 1 and 2 are also robust to these alternatives. They are available in the online
appendix.
Economics and Philosophy 207
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000152
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. GESIS - Leibniz-Institut fur Sozialwissenschaften, on 14 Sep 2021 at 13:44:11, subject to the
Table 4. The impact of NEs and EEs on trust (sensitivity analysis).
Generalized trust (logit)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NE 0.007 0.057** −0.084 −0.086 −0.035 −0.172
(0.077) (0.025) (0.064) (0.060) (0.036) (0.134)
EE 0.305*** 0.320*** 0.249*** 0.473*** 0.556*** 0.247
(0.050) (0.086) (0.059) (0.114) (0.166) (0.419)
NE*EE 0.035
(0.048)
δij −0.997* −0.816*** −0.824 0.565 −1.508
(0.591) (0.216) (0.554) (0.435) (1.235)
δij*NE 0.120* 0.097* 0.250*
(0.063) (0.059) (0.142)




NE item scale 4 10 10 10 10 10 10
Sample Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
Observations 31,285 11,251 31,285 31,285 31,285 31,285 31,285
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.060 0.020 0.107 0.029 0.029 0.030
Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects.
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estimation results of eq. (3) in column (1) (Table A5 part (a) displays the full
results). The main findings are corroborated: the coefficients on NEs and EEs
are of the same size and significance as those reported in Table 3. This gives us
no reason to think that the results are driven by methodological considerations.
Additionally, we examine whether the results in Table 3 are affected by the
operationalization of NEs and EEs as approximated latent factors. As explained
in section 4.2, we approximate the two latent factors by calculating the average
value of the nine items that load highly on the respective factor even if the
respondent has not answered all items. While these measures perfectly correlate
with predicted factor scores, we assess whether this decision has affected the
main results. We therefore approximate the two latent factors by the average
values for only those respondents that have answered all 18 items. This restricts
our sample from 38,278 respondents living in 33 countries to 13,902
respondents that live in 12 countries.25 We re-estimate the regression model
(eq. 1–4) with the newly constructed approximated latent factors. Table 4
displays the results for equation (3) in column (2) (Table A5 part (b) displays
the full results). When comparing the tabulated results in Table 4 with those
tabulated in Table 3, we can observe that the EE coefficient is of comparable size
and significance. Interestingly, the NE coefficient is significantly different from
zero. While the coefficient is small, especially considering the effect size of EEs,
we explore this finding further.
A subset of the 18 items has been surveyed in a very limited set of countries.26
We expect that the limitation of the country sample explains the findings displayed
in column (2). We therefore construct a dummy (δij) that indicates whether
respondents are in the restricted country sample (δij = 1) or in the unrestricted
sample (δij = 0). We add this dummy to our estimation model (eq. 1–4) as well
as an additional interaction term with either NE, EE or both. The displayed
results (columns 3–7 in Table 4) show that the interaction-effect is only
significantly different from zero when interacted with NE (columns 3, 5 & 7).
The effect of EEs on generalized trust, conditional upon controls, remains
significantly positive (columns 4–6). These results suggest that country sample
matters especially for the effect of NEs on trust and not so much for the effect
of EEs on trust. This is in line with other studies that have shown that norm
conformity at the country level is highly diverse and that there are various
institutional factors that affect this (Gelfand et al. 2006, 2011).
5.3. Multilevel analysis
The individuals in our data set live in various European countries. Observations are
therefore likely to be clustered within countries, which is why we have estimated
equations 1–4 in Table 3 using clustered standard errors at the country level.
Another way to account for the nested structure of the data set is to use
hierarchical modelling. Such a model differs from our previous analysis in that it
25The number of observations is further reduced when estimating the regression model, as socio-
demographic variables are not available for all respondents.
26This concerns the following items: avoiding a fare on public transport, accepting a bribe in the course of
their duties, lying in your own interest.
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assigns a statistical model to each hierarchical level (in our case, individual versus
country level) and accounts for the varying group sizes (in our case, country sizes).
Therefore, when working with nested data, it has been argued that such models yield
more efficient estimates (Snijders and Bosker 2012).
We estimate an empty hierarchical model that accounts for the nested structure.
We thus remain agnostic as to the explanation of any country level variation. Similar
to our previous analyses, we use a fixed effects logistic regression model to account
for the binary nature of our dependent variable. Moreover, we include the same set
of socio-demographic factors as done in equations 1–4 but do not display these
results (see online appendix for results). The results in Table 5 indicate that the
key findings are robust to the specification of our model. As expected, the
estimates of the hierarchical logistic model are more efficient than those of the
logit model as shown by the smaller standard errors.
5.4. Disaggregating the effect of NEs and EEs
Based on the factor analysis in Table 2, we have constructed approximated latent
variables of NEs and EEs. We examine whether the findings tabulated in Table 3
are robust at the item level. We conduct the same analysis as in section 4.3, yet
instead of including the average value of NEs and EEs, we relate the separate
behavioural rules to generalized trust. We report the coefficients on NEs and
EEs for equations 1–4 in Table 6 for the first behavioural rule, namely Claiming
state benefits to which one is not entitled. Results for the other items resemble
those displayed in Table 6 and are tabulated in Table A6 in the appendix. The
results indicate that the positively significant relation between EEs and trust also
holds at the item level, keeping other factors constant. We find that the presence
of EEs strengthens trust, even when NEs are controlled for. In contrast to the
results in Table 3, the relation between EEs and trust becomes insignificant
when moving from specification (3) to (4) for the majority of behavioural rules.
It may be the case that the variation that is unique to each rule obscures the
Table 5. Multilevel analyses of trust (sensitivity analysis).
Generalized trust
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
NE −0.001 −0.018 0.040
(0.011) (0.011) (0.048)




Observations 31,285 31,285 31,285 31,285
Number of groups 31 31 31 31
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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relationship that we found at the dimensional level. Factor analysis is not liable to
such variation, since it relies on the variation that is common to all input variables.
We therefore recommend the use of a data reduction technique, such as factor
analysis, in similar applications.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This paper proposes a novel approach to measure civic norm compliance,
introducing a dimension that has not been considered before in the institutional
economics literature. Central to our argument is the theoretical distinction
between empirical expectations and normative expectations (Bicchieri 2006).
Interestingly, we note that survey studies on civic norm compliance have not
included empirical expectations – an individual’s beliefs regarding civic
behaviour of others. Our main findings illustrate that empirical expectations do
matter: normative and empirical expectations are correlated, yet they capture
distinctive dimensions of civic norms. In particular, we show that they have
distinct effects on general trust.
To construct our measure of norm compliance, we have conducted an
extensive search for survey items that can operationalize Bicchieri’s
conditions for norm conformity. We find nine items that capture normative
expectations and nine items that capture empirical expectations for civic
norm conformity. To examine the two types of expectations, we conduct a
factor analysis at the individual level to assess the factor structure of our items.
The results confirm that there are two dimensions to civic norm conformity that
capture the notions of empirical and normative expectations. We examine the
relationship between the two expectations in greater detail by assessing their
relative importance, using the well-known example of generalized trust. We find
that normative expectations’ effect on trust is not significantly different from zero,
Table 6. The impact of NEs and EEs on generalized trust (item level).
Generalized trust (logit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Claiming state benefits NE 0.001 −0.004 −0.024
(0.011) (0.010) (0.030)




Observations 28,984 28,984 28,984 28,984
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.110 0.110 0.110
Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects. *** p< 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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whereas expectations regarding other people’s behaviour contribute to trust. This
implies that trust mainly depends on what we expect others will do: if one expects
that other people contribute to the common good, the inclination to trust is
greater. Robustness analyses indicate that this finding cannot be explained by
response-style biases or choices made with regards to the operationalization of our
variables of interest.
The results indicate that, in the case where normative and empirical
expectations are not simultaneously present, empirical expectations still
motivate behaviour. This finding not only calls for a re-evaluation and
reconsideration of methods to measure civic norms compliance, but has
similar implications for studies that assess other norms such as generosity or
solidarity (Beine et al. 2013; Burda et al. 2013; Helliwell et al. 2016). These
norms qualify as social norms from Bicchieri’s point of view, yet their
measures focus mainly on normative beliefs or stated preferences. While the
current work does not allow us to draw any conclusions regarding these
norms, it can motivate efforts to examine related issues in the proposed
directions. Moreover, there may be alternative approaches to model and
analyse cases in which normative and empirical expectations are not
simultaneously present. Such an extension would be an interesting option for
future research.
Our results have not answered the question why empirical expectations trump
normative expectations. On the one hand, it may be the case that deviant
behaviour is not (sufficiently) punished and therefore the threat of punishment is
no longer sufficient for norm conformity. Normative expectations are then
relatively less powerful in comparison to empirical expectations, which would
explain our finding. On the other hand, our operationalization of normative
expectations as personal normative beliefs may not fully capture the theoretical
notion of normative expectations. However, the use of personal normative beliefs
in other studies did yield the hypothesized effect (Knack and Keefer 1997; Aghion
et al. 2010; Guiso et al. 2011). Future research is needed that differentiates between
these types of expectations and beliefs, such that their interaction with norm
conformity and economic decision making can be further investigated. Other
promising extensions of the current work lie in the generation of new social survey
data that follow Bicchieri’s definition of social norms more closely. Potentially such
methods can be combined with the experimental designs that we find in
philosophy, as Rauhut and Winter (2010) have suggested in earlier work. In this
manner, the complexity of survey research can be combined with measures of
revealed preferences in experimental settings.
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Appendix
Table A1. Keywords to extrapolate items from EVS.
Conditions to social norms
Behavioural Empirical Normative
active interest commandment agree strongly
actually do compatriots duty
apply to you most people has to have
are you our way of life justified
belong to people in general main goal
did you moral rules
do you ever must
do you feel need to
do you often (one) should
do you regularly proper




how often do you
to what extent do you
would you buy
would you give
would you be willing
would you do
Figure A1. Scree plot of eigenvalues.
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Table A2. Extrapolated items from EVS.
Do you think it is justified to do R? (NE) or According to you, how many of your compatriots do R? (EE)
Behavioural rule R Answer categories
F114 F145 Claiming government benefits to which you are not
entitled
F115 F153 Avoiding a fare on public transport NE
F116 F146 Cheating on taxes if you have the chance 1: it is justified
F117 F155 Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 10: it is never
justified
F127 F154 Lying in your (their) own interest
F129 F149 Throwing away litter in a public place EE
F130 F151 Driving under the influence of alcohol 1: almost all do it
F131 F147 Paying cash for services to avoid taxes 4: almost none do
it
F134 F150 Speeding over the limit in built-up areas




Gender (female= 1) 40,909 0.540 0.498 0 1
Married (married= 1) 40,918 0.572 0.495 0 1
Age 40,765 45.061 17.128 15 98
Number of children 40,464 1.669 1.461 0 8
Highest educational level attained 40,616 4.512 2.132 1 8
Unemployed (unemployed= 1) 40,918 0.073 0.260 0 1
Income level 34,673 1.981 0.802 1 3
Generalized trust 39,333 0.297 0.457 0 1
NE*
Claiming government benefits to which you
are not entitled
39,927 8.751 2.048 1 10
Avoiding a fare on public transport 23,676 8.193 2.390 1 10
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 40,071 8.422 2.357 1 10
Accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 40,368 9.200 1.669 1 10
(Continued)
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Lying in your own interest 40,386 8.200 2.240 1 10
Throwing away litter in a public place 40,674 9.157 1.631 1 10
Driving under the influence of alcohol 40,734 9.475 1.274 1 10
Paying cash for services to avoid taxes 38,987 7.828 2.596 1 10
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas 40,510 8.711 1.957 1 10
NE (average) 40,918 8.693 1.307 1 10
EE*
Claiming government benefits to which you
are not entitled
35,767 2.505 0.720 1 4
Avoiding a fare on public transport 17,965 2.667 0.662 1 4
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 36,338 2.245 0.724 1 4
Accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 20,014 2.529 0.720 1 4
Lying in your own interest 19,389 2.218 0.716 1 4
Throwing away litter in a public place 37,360 2.290 0.776 1 4
Driving under the influence of alcohol 37,345 2.608 0.650 1 4
Paying cash for services to avoid taxes 34,877 2.317 0.721 1 4
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas 37,301 2.263 0.705 1 4
EE (average) 38,278 2.393 0.502 1 4
* Unpaired t-tests between each matched pair show that the H0 of equal means can be rejected at the 1% level.
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Table A5. The impact of NEs and EEs on trust (sensitivity analysis).
Generalized trust (logit)
Unrestricted sample (a) Restricted sample (b)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
NE 0.052 0.007 0.171 0.079*** 0.057** −0.035
(0.080) (0.077) (0.203) (0.026) (0.025) (0.075)
EE 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.563 0.356*** 0.320*** −0.023
(0.049) (0.050) (0.354) (0.089) (0.086) (0.340)
NE*EE −0.071 0.040
(0.093) (0.037)
Observations 31,285 31,285 31,285 31,285 11,251 11,251 11,251 11,251
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.058 0.060 0.060 0.061
Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Estimated with country fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.








NE 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
EE −0.001 0.002 0.002 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016)
High ERS
NE 0.000 −0.001 −0.000 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
EE 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
MRS
NE 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
EE 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.019)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6. The impact of NE and EE on generalized trust (item level).
Generalized trust (logit)
Behavioural
rule [R] (1) (2) (3) (4) N
Avoiding a
fare
NE 0.007 −0.001 −0.033 14,303
(0.012) (0.012) (0.035)






NE 0.015* 0.010 0.004 29,477
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020)






NE 0.045*** 0.034*** −0.005 16,420
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030)







NE 0.022* 0.019 0.003 28,400
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028)






NE −0.030* −0.030* −0.036 28,311
(0.016) (0.016) (0.038)
EE 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.130
(0.041) (0.041) (0.134)
(Continued)
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Table A6. (Continued )
Generalized trust (logit)
Behavioural







NE −0.042* −0.044* −0.098** 28,223
(0.024) (0.023) (0.043)







NE 0.020 0.013 0.050** 15,023
(0.013) (0.012) (0.024)







NE −0.020 −0.021* 0.024 30,388
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020)




Estimated with country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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